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Legal
Developments
Auditors’ Legal Liability

Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
The current concern in professional jour
nals and the multitude of recent cases
involving auditors’ legal liability to third
parties would lead one to believe that the
whole problem is a rather new one.
However, if one takes a purely historical
case law approach, one can see a definite
chronological trend toward increasing lia
bility since 1919. More surprisingly, the
legal principles that are followed today
were formulated in the landmark Ultra
mares case1 in 1931. Very little (in legal
terms) has been changed. Only the num
ber of cases has increased, possibly due to
increased investor sophistication and/or
an improved communication system. An
examination of a few of the older cases
and their relationship to some current
cases will demonstrate present applicabil
ity.
The first case (in the United States)
involving auditors’ legal liability was de
cided on the basis of the legal concept of
privity of contract. This case was the
Landell case2 in which the auditors were
not held liable to an investor who relied
upon the audited statement without the
knowledge of the auditors. Since the
investor did not have a contractual rela
tionship with the auditors, the auditors
were not held liable for their negligence.
The court stated that the auditors were
liable for carelessness or negligence only
to their client.
The Glanzer case3 widened the appli
cation of the privity of contract concept.
Public weighers, rather than auditors,
were the defendants. Bech was selling
some beans to Glanzer. Bech asked the
defendants, the Shepard Brothers, to
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weigh the beans and to give a copy of
their certified weight to the buyer
(Glanzer). The Shepard Brothers did so
and were paid by the seller (Bech). When
Glanzer attempted to sell the beans, he
discovered the weight was incorrect. He
sued the public weighers (Shepard Broth
ers) who claimed they were not liable
because they did not have a contractual
relationship with Glanzer. Not so, held the
court. Since the weighers knew the buyer
would rely upon their certification of
weight, there existed a relationship so
close as to approach privity and the
weighers had assumed a “duty to weigh
carefully for the benefit of all whose
conduct was to be governed.”4 Several
cases were decided later on the closeness
of the parties rather than on privity of
contract.
The MacPherson case5 was notable in
that the court held that the defendant
was liable to unknown third parties where
possible injury to “life and limb” was
present, irrespective of contract. The
manufacturer of an automobile was
found guilty and liable when a defective
wheel collapsed and injured an individual
who had purchased the automobile from
a dealer. The implications of this decision
were analyzed in the landmark Ultra
mares case where the court refused to
extend the same liability for negligence to
“the circulation of a thought or a release
of the explosive power resident in
words.” However, fraud does render an
auditor liable and gross negligence can be
an inference of fraud. The judge in
Ultramares examined all aspects of liabil
ity and established the major legal princi
ples followed today. These principles
were a culmination and clarification of
old principles plus the establishment of
new ones. Briefly, they are as follows:

1. Privity of contract is not absolutely
necessary in establishing liability for mere
negligence. Where the relationship is so
close as to approach privity, accountants
are liable to persons who are legally
“third parties.” Such a relationship exists
when the auditor has knowledge that a
third party will rely and/or act upon the
statements. Such a relationship also exists
when an accountant audits a company for
the expressed use by a third party.
2. When mere negligence is present,
persons having no privity of contract (or
its equivalent as described in No. 1 above)
do not have recourse against the auditors.
However, the auditors are liable to their
employer (the audited company) for
mere negligence.
3. Although negligence and fraud are
not the same, gross negligence can be an
inference of fraud. A pretense of knowl
edge where there is no such knowledge is
fraud. The presence of an “intent to con
ceal” is also fraud.
4. Where fraud or an inference of
fraud is present, accountants are liable
both to persons having privity and to all
third parties who rely upon their grossly
negligent (fraudulent) statements.
5. Reliance by third parties is neces
sary to establish liability, even in cases of
fraud.
The early cases following Ultramares
illustrated how workable the distinction
between mere and gross negligence
(fraud) was. For example, in the Beard
sley v. Ernst case,6 the auditors specific
ally stated in their opinion that they had
not examined the records of foreign
constituent companies but had relied
upon statements certified by a firm of
chartered accountants. When the foreign
companies later went defunct, the plain

tiffs sued on the grounds that the audi
tors had “pretended knowledge where
there was no such knowledge.” The court
held that the auditors were not liable as
they had clearly disclosed their reliance
upon information from abroad and there
was “no pretense of knowledge as to the
information received which would make
defendants liable.”
The State Street Trust case7 was
decided against the auditors under the
same Ultramares principles. The auditors
had sent ten copies of a “clean opinion”
to the client with the knowledge that
they would be used to obtain credit.
After a lapse of thirty days, the auditors
sent the client one copy of the statements
with additional explanations which indi
cated that the auditors knew that certain
reserves were inadequate. The amounts
involved were material and the court held
that the auditors were both grossly negli
gent and had an intent to conceal by not
disclosing what they knew to the readers
of the first set of statements.
In more current cases, the same princi
ples have been applied. Much has been
written about the Yale Express case8 in
which the court’s decision against the
auditors was based on the fact that the
auditors knew that their statements were
misleading (as a result of a subsequent
management study) but failed to disclose
it to the persons who were relying upon
the statements. The court held that their
actions indicated an “intent to conceal”
and, therefore, fraud.
The Bar Chris case9 involved many
areas of dispute but the court held that
there were several material misstatements
which the auditors either knew or should
have known. The court held that the
auditors’ opinion on such misleading
statements constituted a “pretense of
knowledge” and “negligence so gross as
to infer fraud.” Two interesting factors
were decided in this case: the judge
attempted to define what constituted
materiality and the court held that audi
tors should not be held to a standard
higher than that of their profession.
In the Continental Vending case10 the
court held that the auditors should have
known that the president of the company
was “looting the company for his own
private dealings” and that the receivable
and payable from the president’s affil
iated company should not have been
netted. The first holding constituted an
“intent to conceal” and the latter consti
tuted “negligence so gross as to infer
fraud.” The distinguishing factor of this
case was the imposition of criminal penal
ties. In other types of cases fraud had

always resulted in criminal charges, so it
is not too surprising that such penalties
were imposed upon auditors.
Two recent cases deserve comment for
their extension of case law principles. The
first, the 1136 Tenants’ Corporation case,
was decided against the accountants al
though no audit was involved. The ac
countants had done only the writeup
work, but the court found that several
glaring misstatements and omissions
(missing invoices, irregular entries, etc.)
constituted negligence so gross as to infer
fraud. The court held that, since these
obvious misstatements were not dis
closed, the accountants were liable even
though they had not conducted an audit.
It is possible that this decision will set a
very unfavorable precedent for future
cases involving accountants.
The second, the Rhode Island Trust
case,11 was decided on the Ultramares
principles even though the auditors had
issued a disclaimer with their opinion.
The court held that in spite of their
disclaimer the auditors had implied in the
notes to the financial statements that
certain nonexistent leasehold improve
ments did exist. This decision points out
the importance of careful and precise
wording in audit reports.
It will be interesting to follow the
trend of auditors’ legal liability in the
future, but, for the present, it appears
that Ultramares is still the major prece
dent and that the principles laid down in
that case are still the major guidelines in
auditors’ legal liability.
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CLASSIFIED NEWS

TEACHING AND GRADUATE
STUDY OPPORTUNITIES

The University of Massachusetts at
Amherst is seeking several new faculty
members and graduate students in account
ing.
Amherst is a delightful New England
town with a large student population. It
offers an active and varied cultural life and
is within easy driving distance of Boston and
New York City.
Massachusetts offers the usual set of
degree programs: B.S.B.A, M.S. with con
centrations in various functional areas,
M.B.A. and the Ph.D. Research support is
available through the Center for Business
and Economic Research. The School also
coordinates the ABLE program, a federally
funded consortium of six universities, pro
viding educational opportunities to minori
ties at the masters level in business.
Faculty appointments are normally
made at the Assistant Professor level and
require a Ph.D. in hand or in progress; CPA
desirable but not necessary. Appointments
for visiting and adjunct professors are also
made.
Salaries and fringe benefits are competi
tive with similar institutions on the East
coast.
Graduate students must have a bache
lor's degree and are admitted to the MBA,
MS in Accounting or Ph.D. program. Finan
cial assistance is available for doctoral stu
dents. Teaching appointments at the in
structor level for better than average
compensation can be made.

Interested persons should contact:
Professor Anthony T. Krzystofik,
Chairman
Department of Accounting
School of Business Administration
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Mass. 01002

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

University of Colorado at Colorado
Springs seeks new assistant professor in
Managerial Accounting. Requires doctoral
degree or one year to completion. C.P.A.
and one to three years business experience
preferred. Rapidly growing campus in ex
ceptionally fine community. AACSBaccredited college offers BSBA and MBA.
Send resume to Dr. Robert Knapp, College
of Business, University of Colorado at
Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs,
Colorado 80907. Equal Opportunity
Employer.
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